This paper develops a production-based asset pricing model with two types of agents and concentrated ownership of physical capital. A temporary but persistent "distribution shock" causes the income share of capital owners to ‡uctuate in a procyclical manner, consistent with U.S. data. The concentrated ownership model signi…cantly magni…es the equity risk premium relative to a representative-agent model because the capital owners' consumption is more-strongly linked to volatile dividends from equity. With a steady-state risk aversion coe¢ cient around 4, the model delivers an unlevered equity premium of 3.9% relative to short-term bonds and a premium of 1.2% relative to long-term bonds.
Introduction
The distribution of wealth in the U.S. economy is highly skewed. The top decile of U.S.
households owns approximately 80 percent of …nancial wealth and about 70 percent of total wealth including real estate. 1 Shares of corporate stock are an important component of …nan-cial wealth, representing claims to the tangible and intangible capital of …rms. As recently as 1995, the lowest 75% of U.S. households sorted by wealth owned less than 10% of stocks. 2 While the degree of wealth inequality in the U.S. economy has remained relatively steady over time (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004) , measures of pre-tax income inequality display a large amount of volatility. Over the sample period from 1918 to 2012, the share of total pre-tax income including capital gains going to the top decile of U.S. households exhibits a mean of 40% and a standard deviation of 5.6% (top left panel of Figure 1 ). 3 Capital's share of income from 1929 to 2012 exhibits a mean of 37% and a standard deviation of 2% (bottom left panel of Figure 1 ). 4 The right-hand panels of Figure 1 show that the U.S. historical equity premium is positively correlated with annual changes in both of the income share variables. 5 In both panels, the correlation coe¢ cient is around 0.3 and statistically signi…cant. Given the concentration of …nancial wealth in the top decile, ‡uctuations in the income share variables would be expected to impact stockholder consumption. A presumed link between stockholder consumption and equity prices is the foundation of consumption-based asset pricing models. While Figure 1 is suggestive, a recent empirical study by Greenwald, Lettau, and Ludvigson (2014) …nds that temporary but persistent "factor share shocks" that redistribute income between stockholders and non-stockholders are an important driver of U.S. stock prices. Motivated by these observations, this paper develops a production-based model of asset pricing with the following features: (1) a stable but highly-skewed distribution of physical capital wealth, and (2) temporary but persistent ‡uctuations in income shares.
Overview
The framework for the analysis is a real business cycle model with two types of agents, called capital owners and workers. Capital owners represent the top decile of earners in the economy.
1 See Wol¤ (2006) , Table 4 .2, p. 113. 2 See Heaton and Lucas (2000) , Figure 3, p. 224. 3 See Saez (2003, 2013) . Updated annual data are available from The World Top Incomes Database. 4 Capital's share is measured as 1 minus the ratio of employee compensation to gross value added of the corporate business sector. Both series are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.14, lines 1 and 4. 5 The U.S. equity premium is measured as the di¤erence between the real return on equity and the real return on short-term bills, from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) , updated through 2012.
These agents own 100% of the productive capital stock-a setup that roughly approximates the highly skewed distribution of U.S. …nancial wealth. I associate capital owners in the model with U.S. stockholders. The consumption of the capital owners is funded from dividends and wage income. I associate workers in the model with U.S. non-stockholders. The consumption of the workers is funded only from wage income. Since workers do not save, all assets (equity and bonds) are priced by the capital owners. The labor supply of the capital owners is inelastic, consistent with the idea that asset prices are determined in securities markets by agents who remain fully-employed at all times. For simplicity, I also assume that the workers'labor supply is inelastic. 6 I consider two types of shocks: (1) a standard labor-augmenting productivity shock that evolves as a random walk with drift, and (2) a temporary but persistent "distribution shock" that causes the income share of capital owners to ‡uctuate over time. Along similar lines, Young (2004) and Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) introduce stochastic variation in capital's share of income in a representative-agent model to help account for various business cycle facts. However, they do not examine the asset pricing implications of this shock. 7 I calibrate the volatility of the productivity shock innovation in the model to match the 2.2% standard deviation of U.S. real per capita aggregate consumption growth (nondurable goods and services) from 1930 to 2012. 8 There are several options for calibrating the volatility of the distribution shock. For example, it could be chosen to match the 5.6% standard deviation of the U.S. top decile income share (top left panel of Figure 1 ) or the 2% standard deviation of the U.S. capital income share (bottom left panel of Figure 1 ). Of these, ‡uctuations in the top decile income share would seem to be more indicative of ‡uctuations in stockholder consumption. Another option is to calibrate the distribution shock to match the observed volatility of the stockholder cash ‡ows that the model seeks to price. Two candidates for such cash ‡ows are real dividends for the S&P 500 stock index and so-called "macroecononomic dividends"de…ned as capital-type income less investment. The latter measure has the advantage of mapping directly to the model's concept of dividends, where capital's share of income is included as part of the de…nition. Figure 2 shows that the growth rate of macroecononomic dividends exhibits a much stronger correlation with the historical equity premium than does 6 Allowing for elastic labor supply on the part of workers would not change the model's asset pricing results because workers do not participate in …nancial markets. Allowing for elastic labor supply on the part of capital owners would introduce an additional mechanism for these agents to smooth their consumption, making it more di¢ cult for the model to achieve a sizeable equity premium.
7 Lansing and Markiewicz (2013) examine the welfare consequences of permanent shifts in the U.S. top decile income share.
8 Data on nominal consumption expenditures for nondurable goods and services are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2 .3.5, lines 8 and 13. The corresponding price indices are from Table 2 .3.4, lines 8 and 13. Population data are from the growth rate of S&P 500 dividends. The correlation coe¢ cient between the S&P 500 dividend growth and the equity premium is close to zero (top right panel of Figure 2 ), whereas the correlation coe¢ cient between U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth and the equity premium is around 0.3 and statistically signi…cant (bottom right panel of Figure 2 ). 9 For the baseline calibration, I set the volatility of the distribution shock to match the 6.3% standard deviation of U.S. real per capita macroeconomic dividend growth for the period 1930 to 2012. With this choice, the model exhibits the property that dividend growth is about three times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth. The baseline calibration can be viewed as conservative given that S&P 500 dividend growth is over …ve times more volatile than U.S. aggregate consumption growth. In the sensitivity analysis, I show how di¤erent calibration targets for the volatility of the distribution shock in ‡uence the model's quantitative predictions for the mean equity premium and other statistics. The conservative calibration for the volatility of model dividend growth is helpful for matching another empirical observation, namely, the relative volatilities of consumption growth for stockholders versus non-stockholders. A study by Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) With a steady state risk aversion coe¢ cient around 4, the concentrated ownership model delivers an unlevered mean equity risk premium of 3.9% per year relative to short-term bonds and a premium of about 1.2% relative to long-term bonds. The corresponding mean risk premia in U.S. data for the period 1900 to 2012 are higher at 7% and 5% respectively, as documented by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, updated) . While higher risk aversion coe¢ cients can raise the model's mean equity premium, such a calibration would cause the model to overpredict the 20% standard deviation of U.S. real equity returns. I show that an otherwise similar representative-agent version of the model delivers mean equity risk premia of only 0.4% and 0.25%, respectively.
Capital owners in the concentrated ownership model demand a high equity premium because their consumption is strongly linked to volatile dividends from equity. The volatility of 9 Data on real dividends for the S&P 500 index are from Robert Shiller's website. Macroeconomic dividends are de…ned as tyt it; where t is capital's share of income (footnote 4), it is real per capita private nonresidential …xed investment plus real per capita durable goods consumption, and yt is constructed as the sum of it and real per capita consumption (footnote 8). Data on nominal private nonresidential …xed investment and the corresponding implicit price de ‡ator are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' FRED database. Data on nominal durable goods consumption and the corresponding price index are from NIPA Tables 2.3.5 (line 3) and 2.3.4 (line 3). equity dividends derives primarily from the distribution shock. The capital owners'consumption growth is more volatile than aggregate consumption growth. This higher volatility serves to magnify the equity risk premium for any given level of risk aversion. In a representativeagent endowment economy with iid aggregate consumption growth, the equity risk premium relative to one-period bonds is given by the product of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the variance of aggregate consumption growth. 10 In contrast, the concentrated ownership model links the equity risk premium to stockholders' consumption growth rather than aggregate consumption growth.
Along the lines of Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) , a long-term bond is modeled as a decaying-coupon consol with a Macauly duration of 10 years. The model's underprediction of the equity risk premium relative to long-term bonds re ‡ects the fact that long-term bonds in the model behave too much like equity-a result that is also typical of endowment economies. 11 The concentrated ownership model overpredicts the volatility of long-term bond returns, again because these bonds behave too much like equity. Nevertheless, the model is able to match the 20% standard deviation of U.S. real equity returns and delivers about one-third of the observed volatility in the price-dividend ratio for the S&P 500 index. The corresponding standard deviations in the representative agent model are substantially lower.
As part of the analysis, I investigate how some key model parameters in ‡uence the size of the mean equity premium. These include: (1) the standard deviation of the distribution shock innovation, (2) a curvature parameter in the law of motion for capital that governs the strength of the capital adjustment costs, (3) a utility curvature parameter that in ‡uences the degree of risk aversion, and (4) a utility habit parameter that allows for time-varying risk aversion. Since the distribution shock is an important source of consumption risk for capital owners, increasing its volatility raises the mean equity premium. All else equal, stronger capital adjustment costs would impair the capital owner's ability to smooth consumption, thereby raising the mean equity premium. O¤setting this e¤ect, however, is the need to recalibrate both shock innovations to always match the volatilities of aggregate consumption growth and macroeconomic dividend growth in the data. The end result is that changes in the adjustment cost parameter have only a small e¤ect on the mean equity premium in the calibrated model. The baseline value for the adjustment cost parameter is picked so that the model approximately matches the 12.7% standard deviation of real per capita investment growth in U.S. data over the period 1930 to 2012. Larger values for the utility curvature 1 0 Speci…cally, we have log E (R is the gross return on a one-period discount bond (the risk free rate), is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and c a t is real per capita aggregate consumption. For the derivation, see Abel (1994) , p. 353. 1 1 See, for example, Abel (2008) , Table 2. parameter or the habit formation parameter both serve to raise the mean equity premium.
However, if the values become too large, the model will overpredict the standard deviation of equity returns in the data.
On the quantity side, I show that the concentrated ownership model performs well in matching the business cycle moments of aggregate macro variables including the pro-cyclical behavior of capital's share of income in U.S. data. A positive innovation to the capital income share induced by the distribution shock causes an increase in real output. In simulations, the model delivers a contemporaneous correlation of 0.3 between capital's share of income and the growth rate of real output-consistent with U.S. data over the period 1930 to 2012.
Finally, I show that the equity premium generated by the concentrated ownership model is predictable using the preceding period's dividend yield (i.e., the inverse of the price-dividend ratio). The estimated coe¢ cient in the predictability regression is similar in magnitude to that obtained using U.S. …nancial market data.
Related Literature
The model developed here is most closely related to Danthine and Donaldson (2002) who also employ a setup with capital owners and workers. 12 The wage contract in their model smoothes workers' consumption against aggregate shocks, a mechanism they describe as "operational leverage." A persistent shock to the relative bargaining power of the two groups creates an additional source of risk that must be borne by the capital owners and contributes to a higher equity premium. When the bargaining power shocks are positively correlated with (temporary) productivity shocks, the model can produce an equity premium relative to one-period bonds close to 6%, but the result is accompanied by too much volatility in the one-period bond return, i.e., a standard deviation in excess of 10%. 13 Other counterfactual implications of their model are: (1) the consumption growth of stockholders is 10 times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth and, (2) the standard deviation of model-implied dividend growth is nearly 20%-about twice the volatility of S&P 500 dividend growth. 14 The model developed here avoids these counterfactual predictions while still delivering a sizeable equity premium. Guvenen (2009) also develops a model with concentrated ownership of capital. Stockholders price equity while non-stockholders price one-period bonds. Stockholders must bear the risk of countercyclical interest payments to non-stockholders which ampli…es the volatility 1 2 Further elaboration on the Danthine-Donaldson model can be found in Danthine, et al. (2008) . 1 3 See Table 4 , Panel B, p. 59 in Danthine and Donaldson (2002) . 1 4 See Table 6 , Panel A, p. 62 in Danthine and Donaldson (2002) . They do not report the volatility of consumption growth for workers. To address the excessive volatility of dividend growth, they introduce an ad hoc mechanism for smoothing paid out dividends. of the stockholders' consumption streams, thereby raising their required return on equity. 15 With a stockholder risk aversion coe¢ cient of 6, Guvenen's baseline model delivers an equity premium relative to one-period bonds of about 5.5%, but he does not investigate the model's implications for long-term bonds. It is not clear how long-term bonds would be priced in his model, since it appears that both types of agents would be willing to buy these bonds.
De Graeve et al. (2010) develop a model that combines elements from both Danthine and Donaldson (2002) and Guvenen (2009) . They allow for three types of agents, all with elastic labor supply: stockholders who price equity and long-term bonds, bondholders who price oneperiod bonds, and workers who do not save. The assumption that one-period bonds are priced by bondholders while long-term bonds are priced by stockholders seems hard to justify. An important limitation of all the foregoing models is that they abstract from long-run growth-a feature that a¤ects the change in consumption from one period to the next. In contrast, the model developed here is calibrated to match both the mean and volatility of real per capita consumption growth in long-run U.S. data. Polkovnichenko (2004) and Walentin (2010) show that a permanent increase in the share of dividend income in stockholders' total income serves to increase the equity premium in endowment economies. A similar mechanism is at work here, except that the distribution shock delivers temporary but persistent ‡uctuations in the share of dividend income in stockholders' total income (which consists of dividends and wage income).
As a caveat, it should be noted that model comparisons with the U.S. equity return data pertain only to publically-traded …rms. A study by Davis, et al. (2006) , p. 119 …nds that privately-held …rms account for more than two-thirds of total private business employment.
The inclusion of privately-held …rms in the equity return data would provide a broader measure of the equity risk premium. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) , p. 765 …nd that while average equity returns for public and private …rms are similar, private equity returns exhibit a lower standard deviation relative to public-…rms'market equity returns. According to these measures, the inclusion of private equity return data would increase the magnitude of the Sharpe ratio in the data that any model would seek to explain.
Model
The model consists of workers, capital owners, and competitive …rms. There are n times more workers than capital owners, with the total number of capital owners normalized to one. Naturally, the …rms are owned by the capital owners. Workers and capital owners both supply 1 5 Guo (2004) develops a similar mechanism in the context of an endowment economy. labor to the …rms inelastically, but in di¤erent amounts. 16 
Workers
Workers are assumed to incur a transaction cost for saving or borrowing small amounts which prohibits their participation in …nancial markets. As a result, workers simply consume their labor income each period such that
where c w t is the individual worker's consumption, w w t is the worker's competitive market wage, and`w t =`w is the constant supply of labor hours per worker.
Capital Owners
The capital owner's decision problem is to maximize
subject to the budget constraint
where E t represents the mathematical expectation operator, is the subjective time discount factor, c t is the individual capital owner's consumption, and 0 is a curvature parameter that in ‡uences the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Along the lines of Abel (1999) , an individual capital owner derives utility from consumption relative to an exogenously-growing living standard index H t = exp( t); where is the economy's trend growth rate. This setup implies that capital owners today are not substantially "happier"(as measured in utility terms) than they were a hundred years ago because individual consumption is measured relative to an ever-improving living standard. The net e¤ect of H t is to change the e¤ective time discount factor which turns out to be useful in the calibration procedure. 17 To allow for time-varying risk aversion, I assume that an individual capital owner's felicity is also measured relative to the lagged per capita consumption basket C t 1 =H t 1 ; which the agent views as outside of his control. 18 The parameter 0 governs the importance of the external habit stock. When = 1; the within-period utility function can be written as log (c t =H t C t 1 =H t 1 ) :
The model setup is similar to a standard framework that is often used to study optimal redistributive capital taxation. See, for example, Judd (1985) , Lansing (1999), and Krusell (2002) . In these examples, however, capital owners do not supply labor.
1 7 The value of is chosen to match the mean price-dividend ratio in long-run U.S. data. The presence of Ht in (1) allows the calibration target to be achieved with < 1; even if steady-state risk aversion is high.
1 8 Maurer and Meier (2008) …nd strong empirical evidence for "peer-group e¤ects"on individual consumption decisions using panel data on U.S. household expenditures.
Capital owners derive labor income in the amount w c t`c t ; where`c t =`c is the constant supply of labor hours per person. Capital owners may purchase the …rm's equity shares in the amount q s t+1 at the ex-dividend price p s t : Shares purchased in the previous period yield a dividend d t : One-period discount bonds purchased in the amount q b t+1 at the price p b t yield a single payo¤ in the following period of one consumption unit per bond. Capital owners may also purchase long-term bonds (consols) in the amount q c t+1 at the ex-coupon price p c t . A long-term bond purchased in period t yields the following stream of decaying coupon payments (measured in consumption units) starting in period t + 1: 1; c ; ( c ) 2 ; ( c ) 3 :::; where c is the decay parameter that governs the Macauly duration of the bond, i.e., the present-value weighted average maturity of the bond's cash ‡ows. 19 When c = 0; the long-term bond collapses to a one-period bond. Equity shares are assumed to exist in unit net supply while both types of bonds exist in zero net-supply. Market clearing therefore implies q s t = 1 and q b t = q c t = 0 for all t: The capital owner's …rst-order conditions with respect to q s t+1 ; q b t+1 ; and q c t+1 are as follows:
where 1 and I have made the substitutions (H t+1 =H t )
(1 ) = exp ( ) and c t = C t for all t: In equilibrium, the capital owner's budget constraint becomes c t = d t + w c t`c ; which shows that the capital owner's consumption is funded from dividends and wage income.
Firms
The …rm's output is produced according to the technology
with z 0 and v 0 given. The symbol k t is the …rm's stock of physical capital and z t is a laboraugmenting "productivity shock" that evolves as a random walk with drift. The drift parameter determines the trend growth rate of output. The shock innovation " t is normally and independently distributed (N ID) with mean zero and variance 2 " : The parameter a governs the relative productivity of the two types of labor inputs. Along the lines of Young (2004) and Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010), the capital income share t can ‡uctuate over time in response to a "distribution shock"v t which evolves as a stationary AR(1) process with persistence parameter and innovation variance 2 u : Allowing the share parameter a to similarly ‡uctuate in response to the distribution shock does not substantially alter the quantitative results. 20 Resources devoted to investment augment the …rm's stock of physical capital according to the law of motion
with k 0 given. The parameter is the capital depreciation rate. The parameter k depends on the elasticity of substitution k between the two inputs that are used to produce new capital, namely, existing capital net of depreciation k t (1 ) and new investment i t :
, new investment and existing capital become more complimentary (i.e., more tightly coupled) which raises the implicit cost of adjusting the capital stock from one period to the next. Kim (2003) shows that the intertemporal adjustment cost speci…cation (10) can also be interpreted as a multisectoral adjustment cost that imposes a nonlinear transformation between consumption and investment in the national income identity. A convenient feature of 2 0 I experimented with versions of the model where at = a exp ( vt) and > 0: the above speci…cation is that it nests the standard linear law of motion with no adjustment costs as a special case. The standard linear law of motion can be recovered by imposing the following parameter settings: k = 1 (or k = 1); B = 2; and = 1=2:
Under the assumption that the labor market is perfectly competitive, …rms take w c t and w w t as given and choose sequences of`c t+j ;`w t+j ; and k t+1+j; to maximize the following discounted stream of expected dividends:
subject to the production function (6) and the capital law of motion (10). Firms act in the best interests of their owners such that dividends in period t + j are discounted using the capital owner's stochastic discount factor M t+j which is given by
The …rm's …rst-order conditions are:
where
; which re ‡ect the constant labor supplies`c and`w: Equations (13) and (14) show that each type of labor is paid its marginal product. The share of total income going to the top decile (i.e., capital owners) is s c t = t + (1 t ) a; while the share of total income going to workers is
Comparing the …rst-order condition (15) to the equity pricing equation (3), we see that the ex-dividend price of an equity share is given by p s t = i t g (k t+1 =k t ) : 21 The equity share is a claim to a perpetual stream of dividends d t+1 = t+1 y t+1 i t+1 starting in period t + 1: In the version of the model with no capital adjustment costs ( k = 1; B = 2; = 1=2), we have p s t = k t+1 : When k = 1 such that k = 0; the capital law of motion (10) takes a Cobb-Douglas form and we have p s t = i t = : These examples demonstrate that the degree of curvature in the capital law of motion can in ‡uence the volatility of the equity price and hence the volatility of the equity return.
Model Calibration
A time period in the model is taken to be one year. The baseline parameters are chosen simultaneously to match various empirical targets, as summarized in Table 1 . In addition to the concentrated ownership model, I similarly calibrate a representative-agent version of the same model. Analytical moment formulas derived from the log-linear approximate solution of both models are used in the calibration procedure. The number of workers per capital owner is set to n = 9 so that capital owners represent the top income decile of households in the concentrated ownership model. The steady state capital income share is set to match the sample mean of 0.37, as plotted in the bottom left panel of Figure 1 . The production elasticity of the capital owner's labor supply is set to a = 0:048:
This value implies a top decile income share in steady state of s c = + (1 ) a = 0:40;
corresponding to the U.S. sample mean, as plotted in the top left panel of Figure 1 . Given these values, the labor supply ratio`c=`w is set so that the steady state wage ratio is w c =w w = 2: For comparison, Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) , p. 24 report a male college wage premium of about 1.4 in 1980, whereas Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) , p. 238 report a male wage ratio of about 4 when comparing the top decile to the bottom decile. The wage ratio w c =w w in this model compares the top decile to the remainder of households, so one would expect it to fall somewhere in between the values reported by the two studies, but likely closer to the value reported by Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) . The quantitative results are not sensitive to the value of this wage ratio.
The capital depreciation rate is set to = 0:07; a typical value. The drift parameter of the random walk productivity process (7) is set to achieve a trend growth rate of 1.86%, corresponding to the sample mean of U.S. real per capita aggregate consumption growth (footnote 8 As discussed in the introduction, the standard deviations for the two shock innovations " and u are chosen to match the 2.2% volatility of U.S. real per capita aggregate consumption growth and the 6.3% volatility of U.S. real per capita macroeconomic dividend growth.
Macroeconomic dividends are constructed from the data as d t = t y t i t ; where t is capital's share of income. The concentrated ownership model requires a higher value of u because the investment decision of the top-decile agents has a smaller proportional impact on the volatility of model dividends versus the investment decision of a representative agent. In the sensitivity analysis, I investigate the e¤ects of changing the relative volatility of the two shock innovations, as measured by the ratio u = " : Di¤erent values for this ratio can be interpreted as re ‡ecting alternative calibration targets for the distribution shock.
Using quarterly data, Greenwald, Lettau, and Ludvigson (2014) identify a "factor share shock" that is highly persistent-close to a random walk. The autocorrelation of capital's share of income in annual U.S. data from 1930 to 2012 is 0.8. Given that the capital income share t appears directly in the de…nition of macroeconomic dividends, I choose = 0:8 for the baseline calibration. A more-persistent distribution shock would impose less consumption risk on the capital owner, thereby shrinking the mean equity premium predicted by the model. The discount factor is chosen to achieve a mean price-dividend ratio of about 29, consistent with the long-run average for the S&P 500 stock index. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) 
The capital owner's time-varying coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA t ) is given by
which collapses to = (1 ) in steady state. The baseline values = 3:3 and = 0:2 imply a steady-state risk aversion coe¢ cient of 4:125. These values deliver a sizeable equity risk premium in the concentrated ownership model without overpredicting the volatility of equity returns in the data. When > 0; excess returns on equity in the model exhibit some predictability-a well-documented feature of U.S. return data (Cochrane, 2008) . I also examine the e¤ects of employing di¤erent combinations for the values of and . 4 Quantitative Results
Impulse Response Functions
Details regarding the model solution are contained in the appendix. The capital growth rate x t k t+1 =k t is the only decision variable. There are four state variables: (1) the normalized
1 a ] which subsumes the productivity shock z t ; (2) the distribution shock v t ; (3) the lagged consumption-capital ratio c t 1 =k t 1 , and (4) the lagged decision variable x t 1 : The last two state variables summarize the in ‡uence of the external habit stock. An approximate log-linear solution is used as a starting value for an alternative solution method that preserves the model's nonlinear equilibrium conditions. The alternative solution employs a version of the parameterized expectation algorithm (PEA) described by Den Haan and Marcet (1990) . The results obtained using the PEA solution are not much di¤erent from those generated by the log-linear solution. (7). With the exception of the workers'consumption, both shocks move the variables in the same direction. A positive distribution shock raises the capital owners' consumption but lowers the workers' consumption, resulting in a small increase in aggregate consumption. In this way, the model is able to match the low volatility of aggregate consumption growth in U.S. data while still delivering a sizeable equity premium.
Investment and dividends both exhibit strong positive responses to the distribution shock.
Relative to the no-shock trend, investment increases by 12% on impact while dividends increase by nearly 6%. Recall that dividends are given by d t = t y t i t: A positive distribution shock raises the productivity of physical capital as measured by t . The capital owner reacts by devoting more resources to capital investment. But even with more resources devoted to investment, the higher value of t combined with the resulting increase in aggregate output y t still allows for a nearly 6% increase in dividends relative to trend. The increase in dividends combined with a larger value of the capital owners's stochastic discount factor (explained further below) deliver an 18% increase in the equity price, in accordance with equation (3).
The fact that a temporary distribution shock can induce a large move in the equity price allows the model to match the 20% standard deviation of real equity returns in U.S. data. However, as we shall see in the simulations, the volatility of the model price-dividend ratio is still below that observed in the …nancial market data.
For both shocks, the responses of investment and the equity price look qualitatively similar. The two variables are linked by the equilibrium relationship p s t = i t g (k t+1 =k t ) ; where movements in i t and the nonlinear function g (k t+1 =k t ) are both in ‡uenced by the curvature parameter k which governs the strength of capital adjustment costs. The small degree of overshooting in investment (and the equity price) that occurs in response to the permanent productivity shock can be traced to the in ‡uence of the external habit stock which introduces the lagged variables c t 1 =k t 1 and x t 1 = k t =k t 1 as additional state variables in the model solution. Intuitively, the overshooting in investment helps to smooth the capital owners'felicity which depends on the lagged consumption basket C t 1 =H t 1 .
Both shocks cause the 1-year bond price to increase so as to satisfy the risk adjusted no-arbitrage condition across the di¤erent asset classes. An increase in the 1-year bond price implies an increase in the capital owners's stochastic discount factor via the equilibrium condition (4). Although not shown, the consol bond price also increases in response to both shocks, but with a magnitude that lies in between the responses of the equity price and the 1-year bond price. I examine the e¤ects of: (1) the relative volatility of the distribution shock innovation, as measured by the ratio u = " ; (2) the capital-investment substitution elasticity k which governs the strength of capital adjustment costs, (3) the utility curvature parameter ; and (4) the utility habit parameter : The vertical line in each panel marks the baseline calibration in the concentrated ownership model. 23 The return moments are computed analytically using the approximate log-linear solution of the model. When either k ; ; or is changed, the remaining non-curvature parameters are adjusted to maintain the same empirical targets shown in Table   1 . To vary the ratio u = " ; I choose u to be a …xed multiple of " while the latter continues to be chosen in each model to match the 2.2% standard deviation of U.S. aggregate consumption growth. Hence, for the plot that varies u = " , the models do not match the 6.3% standard deviation of U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth, except at their respective baseline values for the ratio u = " :
Sensitivity of Mean Equity Premium to Key Parameters
The top left panel of Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of changing the relative volatility of the distribution shock innovation. Higher values of the ratio u = " raise the equity premium in both models, but the gradient is very small in the representative agent model. The equity premium in the concentrated ownership model is more sensitive to the parameter shift because the ratio u = " strongly impacts the volatility of dividends and hence the volatility of the capital owners'consumption growth. In contrast, an increase in u = " has less impact on the volatility of the representative agent's consumption growth.
At the baseline calibration with u = " = 1:855, the mean equity premium in the concentrated ownership model is 3:9% versus 0:5% in the representative agent model. When u = " ' 2:5; the equity premium in the concentrated ownership model is nearly 7%; which is close to the U.S. average over the period 1900 to 2012. However, such a calibration would cause the model to overpredict the standard deviations of other variables, including investment growth and the equity return. Table 3 shows how changes in the ratio u = " a¤ect the standard deviations of selected variables in the concentrated ownership model. Given the other parameter settings, values of u = " that exceed the baseline ratio 1.855 cause the concentrated ownership model to start signi…cantly overpredicting the 6.3% standard deviation of U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth and the 20% standard deviation of U.S. equity returns. The table also provides insight into how di¤erent calibration targets for the volatility of the distribution shock would in ‡uence the model's quantitative predictions. For example, calibrating the distribution shock to match the 5.6% standard deviation of the U.S. top decile income share s c t would imply u = " ' 3 and deliver a mean equity premium around 9%. In contrast, calibrating the distribution shock to match the 2% standard deviation of the U.S. capital income share t would imply u = " ' 1 and deliver a mean equity premium of only 1.4%. In this case, however, the model would signi…cantly underpredict the volatility of U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth, yielding a standard deviation for log (d t ) of only 3.9% versus 6.3% in the data. Since capital's share of income is included as part of macroeconomic dividends, i.e., d t = t y t i t , it would seem more appropriate to match the volatility of the relevant cash ‡ows to be priced, as opposed to matching the volatility of t in isolation. In any case, Table 3 shows the results that would obtain under di¤erent calibration targets for the volatility of the distribution shock. Ideally, one would wish to calibrate the distribution shock to match the volatility of U.S. stockholder consumption growth, but reliable long-run data on this object is not available. The top right panel of Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of changing k : Smaller values of k imply more curvature in the capital law of motion (10). More curvature implies that new investment is more complimentary (i.e., more tightly coupled) to existing capital, thereby increasing the cost of adjusting next period's capital stock via changes in new investment. All else equal, stronger capital adjustment costs impair the capital owner's ability to smooth consumption, thereby raising the mean equity premium. In the …gure, however, all else is not equal. Whenever the value of k is changed, the standard deviations of the two shock innovations must be recalibrated to match the volatilities of U.S. aggregate consumption growth and U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth. For both models, smaller values of k necessitate a lower ratio u = " to achieve the calibration targets. The end result is that smaller values of k serve only to mildly raise the mean equity premium in the calibrated models. The baseline value for k is picked so that the concentrated ownership model approximately matches the 12.7% standard deviation of investment growth in U.S. data from 1930 to 2012. The bottom two panels in Figure 4 show that higher values for either or lead to a higher mean equity premium in both models. This is not surprising given that an increase in either parameter contributes to a higher coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, as shown by equation (17). For any given level of risk aversion, the high volatility of the capital owner's consumption growth serves to magnify the equity risk premium in the concentrated ownership model relative to the representative agent model. The concentrated ownership model can deliver a mean equity premium near 7% if is increased to around 4.5 or if is increased to around 0.4. However, as with increasing the ratio u = " ; increasing either or will cause the model to start signi…cantly overpredicting the volatility of the equity return in U.S. data.
At the baseline values of = 3:3, = 0:2; k = 0:65 and u = " = 1:855; the concentrated ownership model comes very close to matching the 20.1% standard deviation of the equity return in the data. Table 4 provides some direct evidence in support of the model's main mechanism, namely an empirical link between distribution risk, as measured by movements in two separate income share variables, and the contemporaneous equity risk premium. I regress the equity premium in the data on the change in the top decile income share s c t and the change in capital's share of income t . The U.S. data regressions employ the same equity premium and income share data plotted earlier in Figure 1 The regressions on model-generated data in Table 4 show that an increase in either income share variable serves to raise the contemporaneous equity premium R s t R b t . 24 The statistical correlation between t and the equity premium is stronger in the concentrated ownership model than in the representative agent model, consistent with the sensitivity results plotted earlier in the top left panel of Figure 4 .
Model Simulations
The bottom row of Table 4 shows that there is a positive and statistically signi…cant correlation between the U.S. equity premium and the growth rate of macroeconomic dividends with b = 0:289 and a t-statistic of 0:289=0:106 = 2:73: In contrast, the correlation between the U.S. equity premium and the growth rate of S&P 500 dividends is close to zero. This evidence suggests that U.S. macroeconomic dividends can be viewed as a relevant cash ‡ow for equity pricing. In simulations, both versions of the model exhibit a positive and strongly signi…cant correlation between the equity premium and the growth rate of model dividends log (d t ) : For the U.S. data, the top regression results for log (d t ) are based on macroeconomic dividends given by t y t i t ; while the bottom regression results are based on S&P 500 dividends. s c t = top decile income share. Regressions involving s c t are not reported for the representative agent model because s c t = 1 for all t: An extension of the present model that allows for boundedly-rational expectations on the part of capital owners could potentially magnify the volatility of the price-dividend ratio, providing a better match with the data. 27
Despite underpredicting the volatility of the price-dividend ratio, the concentrated ownership model provides a decent match with mean and volatility of the U.S. equity return, which are around 8% and 20%, respectively. The concentrated ownership model overpredicts the mean and volatility of the U.S. short-term bond return, although it should be noted that the return data constructed by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, updated) pertain to a 3-month "bill" whereas the short-term bond in the model has a one-year maturity. The prediction of too much volatility in the short term bond return is a typical shortcoming of models with habit formation (Jermann 1998 and Abel 2008) . It is possible, however, to reverseengineer more complicated laws of motion for the stochastic discount factor (12) so that the expected stochastic discount factor E t M t+1 exhibits little or no volatility, thereby reducing or even eliminating the volatility in the short term bond return. The reverse-engineering approach has the unfortunate side e¤ect of magnifying the degree of steady-state risk aversion that is needed to generate a sizeable equity premium (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) .
As noted in the introduction, the concentrated ownership model's long-term bond behaves too much like equity such that the mean and volatility of the consol are too high relative to the mean and volatility of the U.S. long-term bond return. This de…ciency in the model is well-summarized by the Sharpe ratio comparison at the bottom of Table 5 . The concentrated ownership model does capture the fact that returns on equity and long-terms bonds exhibit near-zero autocorrelation in the data while returns on short-term bonds exhibit strong positive autocorrelation. Overall, the concentrated ownership model substantially outperforms the representative agent model in matching the majority of the U.S. data statistics in Table 5 .
The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows that the equity premium R s t+1 R b t+1 in the concentrated ownership model exhibits a correlation coe¢ cient with aggregate consumption growth of 0.25 versus a value of 0.17 in the data. The correlation coe¢ cient in the representative agent model is much higher at 0.86. Movements in the equity premium are determined in part by movements in the stochastic discount factor. In the concentrated ownership model, the stochastic discount factor (12) depends on the capital owner's consumption which responds di¤erently to shocks than does aggregate consumption (see Figure 3) . In contrast, the stochastic discount factor in the representative agent model depends on aggregate consumption which helps to explain the representative agent model's counterfactual prediction of a strong positive correlation between aggregate consumption growth and the equity premium. Croce (2014) develops a representative agent production economy with long-run risk that exhibits a sizeable equity premium (when applying a leverage multiplier of 2) and a low correlation between the equity premium and aggregate consumption growth. However, his model signi…-cantly underpredicts the volatility of U.S. equity returns. Tables 6 and 7 show that the concentrated ownership model performs well in matching the business cycle moments of aggregate macro variables. By design, the model matches the standard deviations of U.S. aggregate consumption growth log (c a t ) ; U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth log (d t ) ; and U.S. investment growth log (i t ) : The model also matches the standard deviation of U.S. output growth log (y t ) because data on real output are constructed as the sum of aggregate consumption and investment, consistent with the model. Given that the model does a good of matching the volatility of U.S. real equity returns, it also does a good job of matching the 19% standard deviation of real equity price changes log (p s t ) : Using the same calibration targets for the stochastic shocks and the same value for the capital adjustment cost parameter k ; the representative agent model can only match the standard deviations of log (c a t ) and log (d t ) in the data, but not the standard deviations of log (i t ) or log (y t ) : All else equal, the temporary distribution shock has less impact on investment growth volatility in the representative agent model because the agent's consumptioninvestment decision pertains to aggregate consumption which is a much larger base than the capital owner's consumption in the concentrated ownership model. Moreover, recall from Ta-ble 1 that the representative agent model employs a baseline calibration with u = " = 1:024 whereas the concentrated ownership model requires u = " = 1:855 to match the same empirical targets.
In the middle section of Table 6 , we see that the concentrated ownership model underpredicts the volatility of the U.S. top decile income share s c t but overpredicts the volatility of the U.S. capital income share t . This is a consequence of the calibration whereby the value of u is chosen to match the volatility of U.S. macroeconomic dividend growth. Recall that t in the data is measured as 1 minus the ratio of employee compensation to gross value added of the corporate business sector (footnote 4). This measure could underestimate the volatility of U.S. stockholders'capital income share, which is not directly observable. While the representative agent model can match the volatility of t in the data, it makes no predictions regarding the volatility of the top decile income share s c t . The bottom row of Table 6 shows that the capital owner's consumption growth log (c t )
is about two times more volatile than the worker's consumption growth log (c w t ). The source of the extra volatility for capital owners is their heavy reliance on volatile dividends to fund their consumption whereas workers' consumption is funded solely from labor income. From the impulse response functions in Figure 3 , we see that a positive distribution shock that raises capital's share of income t also causes output to rise, implying that labor's share of income Table 6 shows that the capital owner's consumption growth in the concentrated ownership model is only 2.5 times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth.
In the model of Guvenen (2009) , the source of extra volatility for stockholders is the bond 2 8 The data are available from <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vissing/>. market; stockholders make interest payments to bondholders which smooths the bondholders' consumption but magni…es the volatility of stockholders' consumption. Guvenen's model delivers a consumption growth volatility ratio for stockholders relative to non-stockholders of 2.4. In the model of Danthine and Donaldson (2002) , the source of extra volatility for capital owners is the wage contract which smoothes workers' consumption at the expense of larger ‡uctuations in capital owners' consumption. In the version of their model that delivers an equity premium approaching 6%, the capital owners' consumption growth is 10 times more volatile than aggregate consumption growth. 29 The top section of Table 7 shows that macro variables in the concentrated ownership model exhibit mostly strong correlations with output growth-a typical feature of productivity-shock driven real business cycle models. The sole exception is the workers' consumption growth log (c w t ) which exhibits a correlation coe¢ cient with log (y t ) of only 0.11. This result is due to the distribution shock which causes the workers' consumption to move opposite to output, as shown earlier in the impulse response functions (Figure 3 ).
In the middle section of Table 7 , we see that model dividend growth log (d t ) and the model asset pricing variables log (p s t ) ; R s t+1 R b t+1 ; and R s t+1 R c t+1 all exhibit strong correlations with output growth, but the corresponding correlations in the U.S. data are very weak. This observation suggests the presence of additional fundamental or non-fundamental factors that induce movements in real-world dividends and asset prices, but are missing from the model. Along these lines, Greenwald, Lettau, and Ludvigson (2014) argue that "risk aversion shocks" which are unrelated to either aggregate consumption or aggregate labor income are a signi…cant driver of short-term movements in U.S. stock prices. Such a shock could be introduced into the present model by allowing for stochastic variation in the capital owner's utility curvature parameter which appears in the expression for the risk aversion coe¢ cient (17). Another possibility would be to allow for stochastic variation in another preference parameter, such as the stockholder's subjective discount factor :
The bottom section of Table 7 shows that both models capture the procyclical movement of capital's share of income t . As shown earlier in Figure 3 , a positive distribution shock that raises t also induces a temporary but persistent increase in real output. In simulations, the concentrated ownership model delivers a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.28 between t and the growth rate of real output log (y t ) : This result matches the correlation coe¢ cient in the data over the period 1930 to 2012. 30 The top decile income share s c t exhibits a negative correlation of 0:13 with output growth over the period 1930 to 2012. In contrast, the concentrated ownership model delivers a positive correlation of 0.28. Some portion of the observed movements in s c t in the data may re ‡ect a permanent trend whereas the model implies that all movements in s c t are temporary. Looking at the correlation between s c t and log (y t ) eliminates the in ‡uence of any permanent trend. In this case, the data and the model both exhibit a positive correlation, but the correlation coe¢ cient in the model (0.71) is higher than that in the data (0.24). Finally, Table 9 shows the results of forecasting regressions of the type that commonly appear in the …nance literature (e.g., Cochrane, 2008) . The regressions seek to predict either the excess return on equity relative to short-term bonds R s t+1 R b t+1 or the gross dividend growth rate d t+1 =d t using the prior year's value of the dividend yield d t =p t (i.e., the inverse of the price-dividend ratio). Both U.S. data regressions imply that a higher dividend yield predicts higher excess returns on equity. Put another way: when equity prices are temporarily low relative to dividends (i.e., a high value for d t =p t ) future equity prices will tend to rise faster than dividends, pushing the dividend yield back down towards its long-run mean and in so doing, delivering a higher return on equity relative to bonds. The U.S. data results for the excess return regression in Table 9 are in the range of those reported by Cochrane (2008) Since the representative agent's stochastic discount factor is driven by aggregate consumption, excess returns and the dividend yield are less volatile relative to the concentrated ownership model, thus in ‡uencing the value of the slope coe¢ cient in the regressions.
For the dividend growth regression, Table 9 shows that the data yield a negative estimated slope coe¢ cient b = 2:60 for sample period from 1900 to 2012. This result implies that when equity prices are temporarily low relative to dividends (i.e., a high value for d t =p t ) future dividend growth rates will tend to be lower on average, thus helping to justify the current state of low equity prices relative to dividends. However, in the more recent sample Hence, the more recent data imply that a low dividend yield is not predictive of higher future dividend growth. Table 9 shows that the concentrated ownership model can deliver either a positive or negative value of the slope coe¢ cient in the dividend growth regression, depending on the calibration. The baseline calibration yields b = 2:29 while the alternative calibration yields b = 0:12; but latter estimate is not statistically signi…cant. These results can be traced to the more-volatile stochastic discount factor in the alternative calibration which causes movements in the equilibrium dividend yield to be driven almost entirely by movements in expected future returns as opposed to movements in expected future dividend growth rates. Overall, Table 9 shows that the concentrated ownership model can produce regression results that are broadly similar to those obtained using U.S. …nancial market data. For the U.S. data, d t is S&P 500 dividends and p s t is the S&P 500 stock price index. For the models, both calibrations imply a steady-state coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 4.125.
Conclusion
A long history of research since Mehra and Prescott (1985) has sought to develop models that can account for the high mean and high volatility of observed equity returns relative to bond returns. One branch of this research has focused on investigating modi…cations to agents' preferences that govern attitudes towards risk or intertemporal substitution. Another branch has focused on investigating changes to the structure of the cash ‡ows that are priced by agents in the model. This paper falls mainly into the second category. The basic intuition for the results is that capital owners demand a high equity premium to compensate for the risk of linking their consumption to a volatile dividend stream. Since ownership of stock market wealth in the U.S. economy is highly concentrated at the top end of the income distribution, the owners of this wealth must bear a disproportionate share of the risk from shocks that cause their dividend-type income to ‡uctuate.
In the model, volatility derives from two sources: (1) a random walk productivity shock and (2) a temporary but persistent distribution shock that shifts income between capital owners (stockholders) and workers (non-stockholders). As the volatility of the distribution shock increases, the mean equity premium rises and the return on equity becomes more volatile (Table 3) . With reasonable levels of risk aversion (coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion in steady state around 4), the concentrated ownership model delivers an unlevered mean equity premium relative to short-term bonds of nearly 4%. The model can match other quantitative features of U.S. data under the assumption of fully-rational expectations, but it notably underpredicts the volatility of the price-dividend ratio in the …nancial market data. This underprediction could potentially be addressed by a richer model that allows for than two fundamental shocks or non-fundamental elements that give rise to excess volatility.
A Appendix: First-Order Condition in Stationary Variables
To facilitate a solution for the equilibrium allocations, the …rst-order condition (15) must be rewritten in terms of stationary variables. Given that labor supply is inelastic, the combined entity of the …rm and capital owner must only decide the fraction of available resources to be devoted to investment, with the remaining fraction devoted to consumption. The investmentcapital ratio i t =k t is uniquely pinned down by the growth rate of capital. Hence, I employ x t k t+1 =k t as the capital owner's single decision variable. There are four stationary state variables: (1) the normalized capital stock de…ned as k n;t
the distribution shock v t ; (3) the lagged consumption-capital ratio c t 1 =k t 1 , and (4) the lagged decision variable x t 1 : The last two state variables summarize the in ‡uence of the external habit stock. From the de…nition of k n;t and the production function (6), it follows that y t =k t = (k n;t ) t 1 : Dividing both sides of the …rm's …rst-order condition (15) by k t+1 and then employing the de…nitions of x t and k n;t yields:
; for all t;
Using the de…nitions of k n;t and x t ; the law of motion for the normalized capital stock is
which is conveniently log-linear before undertaking any approximation. An expression for the capital owner's consumption growth in terms of stationary variables is given by
where i t+1 =k t+1 and i t =k t depend on the decision variables x t+1 and x t ; respectively, as shown in (A1). It is straightforward to derive analogous expressions for dividend growth d t+1 =d t ; output growth y t+1 =y t ; aggregate consumption growth c a t+1 =c a t ; and the worker's consumption growth c w t+1 =c w t :
A.1 Asset Pricing Variables
Given the equilibrium relationships p s t = i t g (x t ) and d t = t y t i t; it is straightforward to derive the following expressions for the equity price-dividend ratio and the gross equity return in terms of stationary variables:
where i t+1 =k t+1 and i t =k t depend on the decision variables x t+1 and x t ; respectively, as shown in (A1). The above expressions show that the distribution shock (which drives ‡uctuations in t ) has a direct impact on the volatility of the equity return. The remaining asset pricing variables are the one-period bond return R b t+1 (the risk free rate) and the long-term bond return R c t+1 which are de…ned as follows:
where M t+1 is shown in (A1). Approximate solutions for the stationary bond prices p b t and p c t take the form of log-linear decision rules as a function of the four state variables k n;t ; v t ; c t 1 =k t 1 , and x t 1 . The approximate solutions are used as a starting values for the PEA solution described in Appendix C.
B Appendix: Approximate Log-linear Solution
An approximate solution to the transformed …rst-order condition (A.1) takes the form of the following log-linear decision rule for x t as a function of the four state variables
where s 1 through s 4 are solution coe¢ cients. The Taylor-series approximation is taken around the ergodic mean such that e x exp fE [log (x t )]g = exp ( ) ; e k n exp fE [log (k n;t )]g ; and g c=k exp fE [log (c t =k t )]g : After substituting in the various laws of motion, including (A2), into the transformed …rst-order condition (A1), I take logarithms and apply a …rst-order Taylor series approximation to each side to obtain the following expression 
where a i and b i for i = 0; 1; 2; ::: are Taylor series coe¢ cients. The Taylor-series coe¢ cients are functions of the ergodic-mean approximation points e x; e k n ; and g c=k: Similarly, the laws of motion governing the evolution of the endogenous state variables k n;t and c t 1 =k t 1 are approximated as k n;t+1 e k n = h x t e x i k n;t e k n exp ( " t+1 ) ; (B3)
where (B3) follows directly from (A2) with e x = exp ( ) : The conjectured form of the solution (B1) is iterated ahead one period and then substituted into the right-side of equation (B2) together with the approximate laws of motion (B3) and (B4) and the law of motion for the distribution shock (9). After evaluating the conditional expectation and then collecting terms, we have 
which yields four equations in the four solution coe¢ cients s 1 through s 4 : From the transformed …rst-order condition (A1), the Taylor-series coe¢ cients a 0 and b 0 are given by a 0 = f i=k g (e x) = e x; (B6)
where e x = exp ( ) ; f i=k = func (e x) ; f M = func( g c=k; e x); and g c=k = func( e k n ; e x). Given these relationships, the constant term in (B5) yields a …fth equation that pins down the approximation point e k n which depends on the values for 2 u and 2 " :
C Appendix: Nonlinear Model Solution
The impulse response functions in Figure 3 and the model simulation results are generated using the solution method outlined below that preserves the model's nonlinear equilibrium conditions. The method employs a version of the parameterized expectation algorithm (PEA) described by Den Haan and Marcet (1990) . After substituting in the various laws of motion, the transformed …rst-order condition (A1) can be represented as:
f (x t ; k n;t ; v t ; c t 1 =k t 1; x t 1 ) = E t h (x t ; k n;t ; v t; x t+1; u t+1; " t+1 ) ;
where h( ) is the nonlinear object to be forecasted. For purposes of constructing the conditional expectation, the function h( ) is approximated as
where d 0 through d 6 are regression coe¢ cients that are obtained by projecting the true nonlinear function h( ) onto the form (C2) during repeated simulations of the model, as described below. The initial guesses for d 0 through d 6 are computed using the approximate log-linear solution from Appendix B. Given a set of initial guesses for d 0 through d 6 ; a simulation is run where the conditional expectation on the right side of (B1) is constructed each period as
Given the forecast E t h ( ), the nonlinear function (C1) is solved each period for the decision variable x t using a nonlinear equation solver. The endogenous state variables k n;t and c t 1 =k t 1 evolve according to their exact nonlinear laws of motion. The endogenous state variable x t 1 is simply the lagged decision variable. During the simulation, realized values of the nonlinear function h ( ) are constructed. At the end of the simulation, the realized values of h ( ) are projected onto the form (C2) to obtain new guesses for d 0 through d 6 . The simulation is then repeated using the new guesses for d 0 through d 6 with the same sequence of draws for the shock innovations u t+1 and " t+1 : The procedure is stopped when the guesses for d 0 through d 6 do not change from one simulation to the next. In practice, convergence to …ve decimal places occurs after about 160 simulations. The growth rate of S&P 500 dividends is much more volatile than the growth rate of macroeconomic dividends, de…ned as real capital income less real investment. Horizontal dashed lines show the sample means. The equity premium (real return on stocks minus the real return on short-term bonds) is positively correlated with the growth rate of macroeconomic dividends but not the growth rate of S&P 500 dividends. The concentrated ownership model underpredicts the volatility of the price-dividend ratio in the data but delivers three times more volatility than the representative agent model. Similar to the data, the concentrated ownership model exhibits a low correlation between the equity premium and aggregate consumption growth. 
